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Critique: W. Friedmann's
"Law in a Changing Society" t
Roscoe Pound*
While a new book, this is an amplification of the author's 1951
book' in which he gave promise of becoming a leader among
jurists of his time.
More than a generation ago I said: "Law must be stable and
yet it cannot stand still. Hence all thinking about law has struggled
to reconcile the conflicting demands of the need of stability and
the need of change." It is often said that legislatures make laws
and that courts find law. But law may be found in enacted laws
or in reason applied to authoritative sources. In either event social,
political and economic progress call, sometimes gradually but today with increasing urgency and frequency, for change. In legal
history changes in social conditions come gradually; radical
changes come only at relatively long intervals. But rapid and significant changes in economic conditions due to mechanical invention have made the process of accommodating law to actual social
conditions a continuing and pressing juristic and political task.
In 1775, at a time when an Anglo-American common law, as
distinguished from a wholly English common law, was being formed, it took General Washington two weeks to go on horseback
from Philadelphia to Cambridge, Massachusetts, in order to take
command of the Continental Army besieging Boston. In 1961 one
can make the same journey by train in four and a half hours or by
air in one and a quarter hours. In other words, social and business
relations, individual activities, and every-day matters are beyond
what was conceivable in the beginnings of our legal polity. In my
own life span I have seen gradual change from a time when an
ordinary train ran 15 miles an hour and a so-called fast train ran
20 miles an hour to a time when ordinary trains run 60 miles an
hour and fast trains run 100 miles an hour. My grandfather knew
of travel by horse-drawn canal boat; my father knew of travel by
fLondon: Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1959. Pp. 503.
*Dean Emeritus, Harvard University.
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stage coach. When I was a student it took nearly four days to go
from my home in Nebraska to Boston. Today one may make the

journey by air in less than four hours.
My life-time has seen the coming of telephones, electric lights,
automobiles, airplanes, submarines, and atomic energy. Great industrial enterprises employ thousands of individuals in complicated
mechanical operations which involve risk of life and limb; this
imposes a burden upon the legal order unknown at the time the
law of today was being formed. Moreover, the increasing use of
electricity in every-day tasks has multiplied the risks of injury at
home. The courts of today are so burdened with litigation over
claims of reparation for personal physical injury that there is now
agitation to take such claims out of the protection of justice according to law and to commit them to administration.
But relieving the courts of a large share of the task of maintaining justice through a transfer of personal injury claims to less exact and complete (and very likely mechanical) extra-judicial treatment portends the relinquishment of an ideal of justice at a time
when we seem to be moving toward a law of the world. Hence,
Professor Friedmann's inquiry has immediate timeliness. The purpose and spirit of that inquiry are well stated in the preface: "I
claim no more than to have dealt with major social phenomena of
our time, as a challenge to which we must seek a solution, and
which we cannot ignore by pretending that they are not the lawyer's province, but that of the legislator, the politician, the sociologist, or the economist."'2 He adds: "For better or worse, the creative and moulding power of the law has never been greater than
in our highly articulate society. And it has never been more important that lawyers-as legislators, judges, teachers or practitioners-should be more than highly trained craftsmen." 3
In the first chapter, "The Interactions of Legal and Social
Change," the author begins with "the controversy between those
who believe that law should essentially follow, not lead, and that
it should do so slowly . . . and those who believe that the law
should be a determined agent in the creation of new norms . ... I
This "recurrent theme of the history of legal thought . . . is illustrated by the conflicting approaches of Savigny and Bentham." 5
Indeed, the recurrent theme reaches deeper than a polling of the
responses of law to changing or changed social conditions. Whether laws are made or found, and whether the legal order is at bot2. LAw IN A CANGING SOCITY xiii (1959).
3. Ibid.
4. Id. at 3.

5. Ibid.
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tom a glorified process of policing by rules items of conduct, or the
process of adjudication (which directs courses of conduct according to principles), has been debated since philosophers and jurists
began to think about justice and law in antiquity. These are the
authoritative starting points for reasoning.
Today the balance has swung to the side of legislative law-making. But the rapid development of the locality's closer contact with
the world at large, and the locality's increased dependence upon
others for materials and products to maintain industries and activities unknown to the past, have made comparative law a growing point. Thus, jurists are beginning to stress universal principles
and law; that is, the emphasis is on the starting points, on legal reasoning rather than local rules.
Especially noteworthy is the author's discussion of the interrelation of law and social change in the Soviet Union. Moreover,
his discussion of the relation and interaction of legal and social
change is a contribution of the first importance to the science of
law. It stands out in the literature of jurisprudence as an independent investigation which is neither shaped in nor directed by the
author's preconceptions. The author illustrates how significant
changes in social and economic conditions may bring about corresponding changes in law, either by judicial or juristic law finding or by legislative lawmaking. For example, the two world wars
have led to the formation of the doctrine of frustration in the law
of contracts. This has been achieved by judicial decision in the
common-law world and by legislation in the civil-law world.6 Furthermore, the strong tendency toward uniformity in the law of
commercial relations and transactions, notable in law from antiquity, has not been affected by diverse modes of law-finding or
law-making. Changed conditions of life create new commercial interests which require valuation and security. Changed conditions
also necessitate revaluation and different methods of protecting
commercial interests. Of course, new modes of securing interests
develop as old ones lose or weaken their efficacy. Thus, the law
changes as social and economic life change. This discussion leads
to the author's conclusion that "the clear-cut distinction between
the law as it is and the law as it ought to be does not exist"; he
approves of Judge Learned Hand's proposition that law is "the
resultant of many conflicting strains that have come, at least provisionally, to a consensus."7 Much of tie remainder of the book,
6. Id. at 27-28.
7. Id. at 45, quoting HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 71 (1958).
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we are told, "will be concerned with . . . both the possibility and
the limits of such consensus in the various fields of law."'
Questions of judicial law-finding in criminal law and the interpretation of penal legislation are taken up next by Professor Friedmann and they receive an enlightened treatment. The maxims that
penal statutes are to be strictly construed and nullum crimen sine
lege came from the humanitarian era in the eighteenth century when
there was a revolt against inhuman penalties and grossly unfair
treatment of the accused. Today these maxims cover too much
ground; they include serious offenses against the general security
and individual liberty as well as mere breaches of police regulations
and regulations which promote the social welfare state. What we
seek under the social and economic conditions of today is a balance between legislative purpose and policies and a reasonable regard for individual liberty. In international law, in the progress
toward a law (legal order) of the world, the "close interdependence of social cohesion and legal development" seems to assure an
ultimate resort to judicial law-finding in the relations of peoples
and states.
Summing up his discussion of the theory of legal change, Professor Friedmann considers judicial dilemmas in modern political
society. His solution is stated in a prophetic sentence which
points the way for an effective science of law: "What the great
judges and jurists have taught is not infallible knowledge, or a certain answer to all legal problems, but an awareness of the problems of contemporary society and an acceptance of the burden of
decision which no amount of technical legal knowledge can take
from us."9
In the second part, the author examines the impact which social
change has had on our principal legal institutions. He begins with
an analysis of property and its key position in modern industrial
society. The claim of a capacity to acquire, hold, and exercise
control of property as an individual's natural right is fundamental
in the political and legal thinking of Locke, of the founders of our
Anglo-American polity, of the French Declaration of the Rights
of Man, of the interpretation of the United States Constitution,
and of the natural law now taught by the Roman Catholic Church.10
Professor Friedmann also points out that the setting off of the
8. Id. at 48.
9. Id. at 62.
10. Professor Friedmann has shown in another work that St. Thomas
Aquinas and Suarez had not proclaimed this right as a matter of natural

law declared by eternal reason, but rather as a matter of social utility and
convenience. See FRmDMANN,

LEGAL THEoRY

32 (3d ed. 1953).
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right of property as such came with the rise of modem commercial
and industrial society.
Marxists also consider the institution of private property to be
the key to control of the modem industrial society. The capitalist,
as owner of the means of production, exercises effective control of
society. Hence, ownership of all means of industrial and agricultural production is to be in the organized community. While antiquity placed the foundation of social justice in ethics and Western
Europe and America today place it in politics, Soviet thinking
places it in economics, expecting the political organization to
wither away and government control of the means of production
to end.
The thesis of the chapter on property is set forth in the concluding paragraph. While the property rights of the great land
owner and the industrial entrepreneur are now restricted, for the
average person of limited physical assets the idea that private property is an essential condition of freedom is still accepted, and it
has a greater practical effect than it had in the past. Hence, Professor Friedmann concludes that there has been a rebirth rather
than a decline of property rights. 1
In the common law we think of the substratum as well as of the
dimensions of property in terms of function. Hence, we are spared
artificialities of definition which embarrass the civilian. But the law
in Continental Europe is beginning to adopt a more functional
approach. As the author says, "there has never been any doubt in
the common law that property is not just a full theoretical control
over a thing, but a complex of rights, interests, claims, a 'bundle
of powers.' "12 However, the gap between Anglo-American and
Continental thinking has narrowed here, as in so many other points
today; thus, we may confidently look forward to an eventual law
of the world rather than apprehend an eventual disappearance of
law. Renner's picture of "capitalist ownership as an octopus whose
numerous tentacles---contracts of service, loan, hire or instalment
purchase, etc.-enveloped more and more victims"' 3 is belied in
an era of corporate enterprise by the increasing lack of power of
the owner, the individual stockholder, as compared with management control dictated by the technical and administrative complexities of modern large scale enterprises. Mere transfer of ownership of major industrial enterprise does not solve the problem of
control in modern industrial society.
Here we are brought to an important distinction. The power
11.

LAw IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 89

12. Id. at 70.
13. Id. at 73.

(1959).
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formerly exercised by owners of property has passed to managers
of enterprises. But, Professor Friedmann reminds us, the power
still derives from property. The power derives from the secured
claim to enjoy property in the things available and desirable in the
individual life. It is also derived from the ability to affect or interfere with the enjoyment, by others, of these "things." Limitations
upon the exercise of rights have attracted the attention of jurists
from antiquity. In the laws of today, under the term "abuse" or
"abusive exercise" of rights, this subject has become increasingly
important. I remember how law teachers debated the spite-fence
question when I was a first year student of law in 1889 and how
difficult it was for me ten years later to convince a court that it
could and should enjoin a farmer, who had acquired a serious dislike of his neighbor, from building a dam across a draw (which
ran through his land and his neighbor's below) to intercept surface
water coming down the draw in case of heavy rain. Having no
use for the intercepted water he dug a ditch from behind his dam
to carry the water off to a creek. Thus, the farmer cut off the use
of surface water which his neighbor impounded below and used to
water stock. As the author says, the practical interest of the doctrine is smaller than its theoretical interest. No doubt there is a
logical contradiction in terms in the phrase abuse of rights or
abusive exercise of rights. Hence, it has been said that the right
ceases when the abuse begins. However, the question is not one of
logical definition but rather one of social purpose. Professor Friedmann states the matter well: "American legal opinion has moved
far from the days when the sacrosanctity of private property was
the core of its thinking."14
Within a generation we have gone far in imposing salutary restrictions on the ownership and use of property. Redistribution of
ownership and control of financial credit are now regarded as the
legitimate ends of legislation whereas they would have been abhorrent to the generation in which I was brought up. But, as Professor
Friedmann points out, these changes have resulted from the growth
of corporate power. 15 What must stand first in the society of today
is the protection provided for the use of the individual's labor
and skill, and security in his opportunity to use them. Doing away
with private property is not the path to security for these interests.
Next, the author examines the striking contrast between the law
of contracts as I studied it 70 years ago, and to some extent taught
14. Id. at 80.

15. Corporate power, the law, and the state are discussed in chapter 9
as part of Professor Friedmann's examination of society and the individual.
Id. at 288.
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it 60 years ago, and the actual function of contracts in the society
of today. In the formative era there were four elements in each
contract: freedom of movement, insurance against calculated economic risks, freedom of will, and equality between parties. They
were "closely linked, and to some extent, overlapping, but each
had a distinct meaning."' 6 The first two were essentially formal
in character;
the other two "expressed political and social ideologies. 1
In a developing industrial society, the contract was an institution which enabled men and goods to move freely; this aspect
was seen by Sir Henry Maine in his theory of the development
from status to contract. Thus, the author compares the static rural and patriarchal society of the South before our Civil War with
the industrialized and commercialized North. The latter required
unrestricted mobility of labor and held economic bargaining value
to be the standard which regulated the demand for labor. When I
began to teach law in 1904, Maine's doctrine was applicable to
every aspect of life. Those who came to it after the metaphysicalethical expositions of Blackstone in which our teachers had been
brought up, had accepted it as ultimate truth. It is a real service
to the science of law, therefore, to remind us that development of
the social service state, group organization and collective bargaining in industry and commerce, and industrial mobilization have
been reversing the movement Maine taught, at least to the extent
of a new kind of immobility.
Freedom of will, applied to the creation and the terms of a contract, does not raise questions which need special consideration.
But formal equality all along the line was regarded by the older
utilitarianism and democratic theory as being promotive of social
liberty and equality. However, as Dicey pointed out in 1905, the
actual development of capitalist society was increasingly out of
accord with this theory of which the law of contracts was an expression. Accordingly, the author devotes the greater part of his
argument to "the growing gap between the early philosophy of
contract and the reality of contemporary society."'" It is affected
by his feeling, natural in one schooled in Continental juristic theory, of "the organic weakness of judicial law reforms." 9
As the author states, no developed system of law has ever maintained or even attempted an absolute freedom of contract; on the
other hand, no legal system has been wholly indifferent to a mani16. Id. at 90.
17. Ibid.
18. Id. at 95.
19. Ibid.
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fest inequality between the parties. Equity granted relief to infants, trust beneficiaries and others under legal disabilities. Nevertheless, the general interposition of equity has not gone substantially beyond the adjustment of rights of property. Thus, the author demonstrates that American courts, with all the opportunities
that our common law system seems to offer, "cannot effect major
social adjustments by using contract as a social equaliser."20
The remainder of the chapter on contracts is devoted to
what the author terms "the transformation of contract"; that is,
"a transformation in the function and substance of contract, which
is creating a widening gap between legal reality and the traditional textbook approach."'" He finds four principal causes for
this transformation: a general concentration of industry and business which has resulted in the standard contract, or, as the French
put it, the "contract of adhesion'; second, an increased substitution of collective for individual bargaining in industry; third, an
expansion of the social service functions of the state in the common-law world which has led to statutory contract terms; and,
fourth, as a result of wars, revolutions, and inflation, a development of legal excuse for non-performance-for example, the doctrine of frustration. This study of the general legal effect of contract standardization must profoundly affect much that has been
taken as established in the science of law as understood in the English-speaking world.
The author examines the compulsory terms of a contract as required by the public interest (especially as a device to enforce social policies), public authorities as parties to a contract, collective
bargaining, and contract as the realization of economic expectations. The mere list of these headings shows Professor Friedmann's
vast departure from what the jurist and law writer of the past regarded as the field of the law. In summary, the author shows that
contract is being moved into public law. It is becoming increasingly institutionalized as an expression of social and economic policies. As a result, there has come to be an exercise of public law
functions by what are in name private law groups. Collective bargaining has gone far toward giving the employee an assured status.
Finally, the law of contract now expresses social economic policies,
and the ethical individual conception is no longer in the foreground.
As the author puts it, the "contract becomes the foundation for a
broad adjustment of risks in which private agreement and public
policy are mingled."22
20. Id. at 99.
21. Id. at 101.
22. Id. at 125.
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My teachers would have paused at the title of the next chapter---"Tort and Insurance." Can it be, they would have asked,
that a man can be insured against the consequences of his own
wrongdoing? The very word "tort" speaks of a wrong done for
which the doer must answer. Indeed, when I began the study of
law in 1889, the teaching of the law of torts was what would be
regarded today as wholly inadequate. We studied assault and battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, slander and libel,
trespass to land, and conversion of chattels. There were a few lectures on negligence but the subject was not really studied. In
truth, there was little negligence, as it is known today, in a prairie
community in those days. Such things as automobiles, electric power lines, or exploding bottles were unheard of. Furthermore, the
extent of liability has been radically altered. Originally, liability
existed only for intentional attacks upon the person or for the intentional taking or injury of another's property. Then liability was
extended to cover the subjection of a person or property to unreasonable risk of injury, if an injury occurred; this extension resulted in the consideration of intentional and negligent injuries together in the broad category of fault. Liability is now being supplemented, if, indeed, it has not already been supplemented, with
the imposition of liability upon industry for undertakings which
involve risks (and injury) to employees or to those who acquire
or handle the product. We still keep the term tort. But it has
ceased to point necessarily to any element of wrongdoing. As the
author says, while western society has not completely abandoned
the ideal of individual responsibility for social conduct, a growing emphasis is placed on the community's responsibility for accidents that befall the individual. This, he adds, is not an abandonment of individual responsibility in the older situation which called
for reparation; however, it is an "objectivation" of fault liability
when we deal with corporate rather than individual persons.
Here we are brought to a serious question raised by the shift of
liability from the one who acts to the one better fitted to "absorb"
the risk. This shift began in the formative era of law with the
master's liability for an injury caused by his servant; the master's
liability was derived by analogy from the head of a household's
liability for an injury caused by a dependent member whom he
was bound to defend. In modern law this vicarious liability was
justified by attributing it to the power of control which the master had, and the employer in modern society was likened to the
master. As the author puts it, the enterprise presents certain risks
to the community for which it must carry the responsibility.

126
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Today, any shift of the burden of repairing injuries is affected
by the general practice of private insurance against automobile accidents, whether voluntary or compulsory. Recently air transportation has been adding to the awesome annual total of injury due to
factories and automobiles. As I said some years ago, "Tempest,
fires, flood, pestilence and famine, which men used to fear, as our
prayer books bear witness, take no such toll today." Accident injuries "have made even war take a second place." How to cope
with this situation has become perhaps the most pressing problem
of the law reformer of today. Accordingly, the author looks into
the progression from individual responsibility imposed by tort liability to the idea of social insurance, particularly as developed in
the United States through workmen's compensation laws. He shows
that two lines of development have taken place: first, tort liability
has been extended; and second, the legal burden has been shifted
from the active agent in the injury to a third person. Thus, by an
analysis of the relation between these two developments, the author considers the future of the law of torts.
The author analyzes the duties of manufacturers, builders and
repairers to those who acquire and use their products. These
duties are based on a theory of contract liability unless the injury
occurred in the course of use. In the latter situation liability is
based on an idea or duty of care. The manufacturer's contract liability to the distributor does not exclude his tort liability to the
user. This has been extended by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
In addition, the principle of nonliability of a principal for the
torts of an independent contractor has been subjected to so many
exceptions that the principle is now one of liability rather than of
nonliability. Hence, liability is imposed on the person in control of
the enterprise. Also, in American law, the immunity of hospitals
from liability for the negligence of its employees is now rejected
by most of the stronger courts. Although the law has not grown
up consistently, the principle is now being accepted that the occupier of property is liable in tort for any possible damage that he
might have foreseen. Finally liability under the doctrine of Rylands
v. Fletcher is being extended. One consequence of putting liability on a broader basis is that it is increasingly hard, in practice,
for a defendant to escape liability if he has imposed a risk on others.
Correspondingly, it is easier for one who has suffered injury to
obtain redress.
A related subject, in which significant change has taken place
within a generation, is the employer's duty to his employees-or,
23. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
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what my generation called the relation of master and servant. This
is not merely a matter of legislation. As a proposition of common
law, an employer has, within the past generation, become bound
to provide competent supervisors, proper and safe appliances with
which to work, adequate systems of operation, and due supervision.
Any failure to provide these essentials is considered negligence.
Moreover, the courts at the same time are finding negligence
where the courts of the past could not see it. Volenti non fit injuria, the fellow servant rule, and even contributory negligence
have either disappeared or are disappearing as defenses available
to the employer.
Professor Friedmann considers that in comparison with England,
which after the second World War experienced reaction in the direction of judicial conservatism, the American courts have continued the extension of tort liability. However, objective standards
of conduct rather than individual items of behavior continue to be
the test of what we still think of as fault liability. Nevertheless,
there has been a far reaching shift of responsibility for injuries and
the burden of reparation is imposed on the enterprise instead of on
the victim. Moreover, I feel we must agree with him that a problem
of spreading risk from the person immediately concerned to a larger group seems to be increasingly pressing. Accordingly, he looks
to the agencies of private or social insurance to take over considerable areas of what we have been calling tort liability. No doubt,
as he tells us, the adjustment of insurance and tort liability, when
the two are applied to the same incident, must steer between the
Scylla of double compensation to the victim and the Charybdis of
immunity for the tort-feasor.24 Neither the amount of carelessness
nor the accident rate are noticeably affected by the degree of civil
liability fixed by law. In addition, the idea of a moral element in
legal civil liability for negligence is only a leftover from legal history.
I shall not attempt a review of the different plans for the adjustment of insurance and tort liability. That task has been undertaken by Professor Fleming James. Instead, it will be enough to indicate four propositions which Professor Friedmann uses to conclude
the chapter. They are: (1) In the socially most significant parts
of the law of torts-traffic and industrial accidents and manufacturer and employer responsibility-the fault principle has either
been superseded or lost its moral significance and, therefore, tort
law is barely distinguishable from strict liability. However, he be24. Compare id. at 348. I assume that the ethical connotation of "tort-

feasor," which gets its flavor from history, has little real significance.
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lieves that this movement has been arrested by the spread of social
and private insurance. (2) The principle of "minimum compensation for the vicissitudes of modem life," met by comprehensive
social insurance, or partial schemes of social insurance such as
workmen's compensation or automobile-accident insurance legislation, or compulsory private insurance with compulsory third party
liability has been widely accepted.25 (3) The dilemma of double
compensation for the victim or indemnity to the tort-feasor has been
reduced because many cases of apparent double compensation are
really cases of collateral benefits, and the moral significance of
fault liability has become very restricted. (4) The "admonitory
function of tort liability" could be restored by restricting tort liability to gross or criminal negligence; thus, the relationship of fault
liability in tort would exist as it does in criminal law.
Professor Friedmann also recalls Holmes' forecast, as far back as
1881, that the state might at some time thereafter take over the
whole field of compensation for injury and replace the law of torts.
Here is food for thought for the common-law lawyer who characteristically thinks of and looks to adjudication rather than to administration.
Chapter 6 examines criminal law, a subject which the commonlaw writers on jurisprudence have given relatively little attention.
Austin left only 25 pages of fragmentary notes on criminal law in
his Lectures on Jurisprudence. Holland, in his later editions, devoted a scant half dozen pages to the subject. I must confess myself
guilty of a like neglect of a field of the legal order deserving of
better and fuller treatment. 26 There is a fashion in such things.
From Roman times institutional writers have devoted themselves to
the civil side. Professor Friedmann, however, has maintained a better proportion. The subjects he has taken up are modem psychiatry and the responsibility of the individual, social environment and
the modification of penal sanctions, the changing scope and function of criminal law, economic crimes against the community, the
corporation and criminal liability, strict criminal responsibility and
public welfare offenses, and para-criminal sanctions. We are rightly
told that the state of the criminal law is a "decisive reflection of the
social consciousness of a society ' 2 7 and so it is particularly sensitive to changes in social structure and social thinking. He goes
fully into the mooted question of the M'Naghten rule. Thus, he
25.

LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY

163-64 (1959).

26. Although I have had occasion to teach the subject in two law
schools, I find but three references to it in the index to my five volume

work. See PouND, JuIusPRuDENcE (vols. 1-5 1959).
27. LAw IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 165 (1959).
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points out that the legal order is based on the assumption that
man is a rational being so that the "norms of order in any given
society can be based on the hypothesis that the great majority of
men and women are capable of controlling their conduct."2 He
adds that "to deny the assumption means no less than the denial
of the possibility of a legal order."29
In the present century a profound change has taken place in
the treatment of juvenile offenders. Beginning 50 years ago, the
juvenile courts, with procedures and sanctions very different from
those of the ordinary courts, superseded the latter's jurisdiction
over offenders under an age usually fixed at 18. Indeed, there is
now a tendency to take away the juvenile court's power to apply
sanctions and, instead to commit the juvenile to an administrative
child welfare agency or a youth authority. California, for example,
has gone so far as to set up an adult authority on the model of the
youth authority, hence, the courts' jurisdiction and authority to
maintain the general security is again transferred to an administrative agency. The assimilation of judicial procedure by administrative procedure has obvious dangers, as has been brought out
much of late, and the maintenance of a balance between rule and
discretion becomes a larger problem each day. But, as Professor
Friedmann notes, "We should direct our attention to the working
out of the safeguards against the abuse of welfare activities rather
than against their substance. This applies to the field of criminology
no less than that of administrative discretion in general.""0
Finally, the chapter examines in detail the protection of public
economic interests, the growth of corporations as active economic
agencies, and the welfare functions of the state of today. Antitrust
legislation recognizes, as part of the criminal law's protection of
the nation's basic economic order, the need to maintain a competitive economy based on private enterprise. These laws, which are
designed to insure free commercial and industrial activity, have
become a source of embarrassment to the criminal law. In addition, they have often made it impossible for business enterprises
to obtain assured advice as to the legality of a projected undertaking; hence, free enterprise has been restrained rather than aided by
the effort to promote it. Thus, something analogous to strict liability in the law of torts has developed in criminal law and it is
justified as a method of balancing social interests. As the author
says, the "purpose is to compel business to apply stricter standards of inquiry and control to transactions which may endanger
28. Id. at 176.

29. Id. at 176-77.
30. Id. at 185.
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public security." 31 But he feels we have here an administrative
rather than a penal problem.
This analysis of criminal law is concluded by an examination of
an individual's vital interest-his right to work-which can be injured beyond the protection of judicial trial. The author notes that
there is a danger of a legal no-man's land arising "where an individual can be effectively injured or even destroyed, without the protection of the criminal process or the legal safeguards of administrative justice."32
In chapter 7 the author considers the basic concepts and principles of the Western family with respect to the relationships between husband and wife, parent and child, and family and State.
Until the arrival of the industrial age, the family in the Western
world was the basic economic and social unit; this was felt to have
a religious foundation. The family was dominated by the father as
head of the household while the married woman "was confined
to the control of the domestic sphere." However, profound changes
continue to occur. Among these changes are new expressions of
social philosophy, improvements in the economic status of the
family, and the rise of the social service state. The author then considers the indissolubility of the marriage tie and the "breakdown
principle." This principle is applied when the marriage is disrupted
beyond redemption, and its maintenance only "serves to undermine and poison the relations between the various members of the
family." 3 Under the heading "Changing Foundations for the Cohesion of the Family," the author considers preventive care and
public policy, and, in particular, the domestic relations and children's courts. He arrives at the eminently sound and well founded
conclusion that "divorce and separation proceedings are not just
another form of litigation, but one aspect of a precious and complex social institution, the family, and that they have to be dealt
with as a social and therapeutic problem rather than in terms of
the success or failure of a legal action."3 4 One might add that
in the United States the domestic relations court involves only one
aspect of the court organization problem which has not received the
attention it requires.
The author proceeds to an ethical, sociological, psychological,
criminalogical and juristic consideration of the goal of marriage
and the legitimacy of abortion. While I have little capacity to assess this analysis, it is clearly carried on with assured competence
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 200.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 210.
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and thoroughness. Finally, Professor Friedmann considers the
equality of husband and wife in the marriage community, matrimonial property law, parents and children, the illegitimate child,
and the State and the family. The author's treatment is comprehensive; he has canvassed the legal mateiials and assessed the value
of both present and projected laws. This is an exceptional contribution to comparative law. I would call attention particularly to
what is said about the community idea in the management of family affairs. It is illustrated by "the introduction of the joint income
and property concept into Federal Tax declarations by husband
and wife in the United States, '35 the "replacement of the more or
less absolute powers of the father, based on property rights, by
broader moral and legal responsibility towards his children;"3 by
"the translation of the social and legal emancipation of the married woman into a corresponding equality of rights and duties towards the children;"'3 and by "the increasing responsibilities of
the State and other public authorities for the welfare of children."3
Also a duty of support has been emerging as legal duty toward a
legitimate minor child-this is also being extended to the wife.
Moreover, there is a worthwhile review of the status of the illegitimate child.
In the summary we are told that the social security plans of today seek to strengthen the family although much of the traditional
private law of the family may be modified. "Here, as in other
fields," we are reminded, "only a combination of public and private
responsibilities can create conditions that are in accordance with
contemporary social needs."39
The third part of the book, "Society and the Individual," examines (1) the freedom of economic movement, (2) the relation
of group power and the modem state, and (3) the limits within
which administrative supervision of private organizations can operate without jeopardizing the organization's necessary freedom.
First, the author considers some "basic antinomies." For example, there are the difficulties and contradictions inherent in Bentham's idea of free trade. Bentham proposed that there should be
an equal opportunity to trade freely. Thus, Bentham expected,
"the pursuit of each trader of his economic advantage would work
out to the common good." Experience, however, has shown that
while an industrial society needs competition, unrestrained compe35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
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tition may lead to destruction of all competition. A critical survey
of English judicial and American legislative treatment of freedom
of trade and restrictive practices brings out the inability of courts,
trained in traditional legal techniques and principles, to deal with
deep economic and social problems by a course of decision from
case to case. A comparison of English decisions on restrictive trade
practices, which are based on common-law principles and of American decisions interpreting the fourteenth amendment, is very suggestive.
Philosophy of law has always thought its chief problem was the
reconciliation of an individual's freedom with the freedom of others. But, as the author points out, the real problem of the legal order is to determine how to reconcile this fundamental dilemma in
practice under changing economic conditions. How we endeavor
to deal with the latter problem is the point of this part of the
book; how we may, on the basis of reasoned experience, solve the
problem is the end purpose of the whole book.
In order to show that the traditional juristic treatment of the
problem has failed to meet the exigencies of an increasingly complex and changing economic order, the author discusses "the escapist approach" of British courts, of British anti-trust legislation,
and of American anti-trust legislation, and he concludes that we
should "come more and more to regard specialised courts or other
quasi-judicial agencies, which are not exclusively staffed with lawyers, not as 'extraordinary' courts, but as a new form of tribunal
demanded by the social conditions of our time."40
A similar suggestion with respect to the legal treatment of other
problems is being urged by others. For example, the National
Probation and Parole Association (now the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency) called for the creation of "family courts"
in 1959. One must concur with Professor Friedmann as to the need
for the tribunals he proposes. However, if his proposal is adopted,
it must be recognized that the unnecessary multiplication of independent specialized judicial or administrative agencies is always
a danger. Each tribunal will be complete in itself and, hence,
there will be potential conflicts of jurisdiction with like tribunals
or agencies. Today there is also a need for a better organized judicial system to provide a unified court with a competently chosen
and responsibly directed staff. The reshaping of our institutions of
public justice to meet the requirements of today is inevitable. Perhaps, a Ministry of Justice as proposed by Bentham in 1823 and by
Cardozo in 1921 is the ultimate solution.
40. Id. at 286.
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In chapter 9, "Corporate Power, the Law and the State," the author relates group power in the modern state to the freedom of
the individual. We are rightly told that the legal problems involved
in this relation have, until recently, escaped juristic discussion commensurate with their importance. Accordingly, he considers the
accidents of legal form which, especially in Anglo-American law,
have left group power outside of legal control. He calls them the
"legal cloaks of corporate power." They are the ability and power
of great organizations which are engaged in commercial operations
to escape the liabilities of corporate personality, the exceptional
possibilities of a trust cognizable only in equity, the limitations
of equitable remedies which prevent judicial handling of abuses of
power except where property interests of members or beneficiaries
are involved, and the liberal interpretation given to the term "charitable" in connection with charitable trusts.
As Maitland said in 1936, the trust cognizable only in equity
gave us a liberal supplement for a meager law of corporations applicable to charities and other non-commercial institutions. But
today these unincorporated associations have acquired many attributes of legal personality. Hence, the reluctance of charities to
incorporate has decreased, and the legislatures have subjected these
unincorporated associations and associated activities to "corporate
liabilities." Nevertheless, traditional theory assumes that an association is private rather than public, and, hence, it should be classed
with the individual man in evaluating its relation to the public.
Therefore, we must readjust our traditional juristic thinking to the
economic and social developments of today. Accordingly, the chapter proceeds to take up social and legal impacts of the American
foundation, corporate power and the state, and the international aspects of corporate power. This discussion contains a competent
and critical comprehension of comparative law, of current AngloAmerican legislation, and of adjudication; furthermore, the author's understanding of the relevant economic and sociological
materials is beyond anything our common-law jurists have attempted.
What has just been said also applies to chapter 10--"Individual
Freedom, Group Control, and State Security." The only suggestion I could make to this well informed, well organized, and enlightened discussion is to refer to the possible utilization of the
common-law doctrine of duties and liabilities which are imposed
on either public service performances or those engaged in public
employment.
In conclusion the author calls attention to the "increasing inter-
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penetration of public and private law elements. ' 1 The totalitarian
state can adjust itself to the problem thus presented by turning
private law into public law. This is not possible in the mixed
economic systems of today's industrial democracies. What is called
for is "a more than formal safeguarding of 'due process' in the
personal, political and social life of the individual."4' 2 The author advocates that a distinction be made between the affairs of
private associations which affect the basic freedoms (opinions,
movement, business, work) and those which do not (social
clubs). As to the former, due process protection is developing
through the reviewability of unfair practices and the assurance of
procedural safeguards. However, continuous administrative supervision of private institutions will "jeopardize that minimum of
freedom of association without which democracies can slide to the
brink of totalitarianism.""
Part IV, "Public Law," devotes two chapters to the legal aspects
of public administration. In chapter 11, "The Growth of Administration and the Evolution of Public Law," the author notes that
the "growth of the administrative process has been a universal
phenomenon of contemporary society . . ,,." As society became more complex it became necessary to add to the already existing functions of defense, administration of justice and police
regulation. These were taught to my generation in the eighties
and nineties of the last century as the whole business of government. A continually increasing list of specialized social services has
grown up everywhere. It extends from the assumption of managerial as well as regulatory control of economic activities in a socialized country, to the mixed economies of Western Europe in which
managerial and regulatory administrative functions are combined,
to the now highly developed administrative law in the United
States where little attention is paid to the managerial aspect of the
administrative process and the emphasis is placed on regulatory
functions. Between a regime of unregulated economic enterprise
and one of public ownership, systems which are rejected by American public opinion, we rely upon public regulation. However, in
our highly industrialized society regulation is complicated by our
polity of 50 state governments with general local governmental
powers and a superimposed Federal Government of specified powers. This requires "a vast and complicated mechanism of administration." Understanding administration to mean "public supervi41. Id. at 343.
42. Id. at 344.

43. Ibid.
44. Id. at 347.
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sion and control of private and official activities," the result is that
the United States "is the administrative State par excellence."4 5 It
has not been easy for one brought up in the common-law tradition
taught to my generation to realize this. But, as the Reverend
Mr. Jasper puts it, "the sun do move."
Next the author takes up the need for a system of public law.
In an absolutist state there is no place for a distinction between
public and private law. As Professor Friedmann states: "Ultimately, all law dissolves into administrative discretion."46 But, as he
points out, three jurists who rank among the foremost rejected
this dichotomy. In order of time, they are Albert Venn Dicey,
Leon Duguit, and Hans Kelsen. Neither Duguit nor Kelsen have
influenced American thinking on this subject, although Kelsen does
consider that administrative law makes public authority arbitrarily
superior to the private citizen.
On the other hand, Dicey vigorously opposed the recognition of
administrative law in the common-law world and his influence long
hindered its proper development. Professor Friedmann shows,
what I suppose the common-law lawyer of today has grudgingly come to concede, that the government "cannot in all respects
be equal to the governed, because it has to govern."'4 That is,
"inequalities between government and citizens are inherent in the
very nature of political society."4 To those who carried Dicey's
views to the extreme, administrative law was not law at all. Thus,
even as late as 1959 I felt that I had to argue that administrative
law could properly be called by its name of law. One of the obstacles to recognition of a distinction between public and private
law was the doctrine of separation of powers. The argument was
made that there was no place for administration in the three-fold
distribution of governmental power. This argument is disposed of
by the author in a section entitled "Separation of Powers and Administrative Law." There the argument is correctly dismissed as "a
fallacy of conceptualism."
Next, the author examines the limits of administrative discretion.
Discretion is a subject which has fared badly in common-law
thinking and writing. Lord Camden commented that the discretion
of a judge "is the law of tyrants." Lord Penzance agreed; he noted
that it is the exercise of judicial discretion which "shakes public
confidence in the justice of the tribunal." Now that separate courts
of equity and equity procedure are being abandoned, we must
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 349.
Ibid.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 352.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:117

revise much that has been thought and said about discretion. What
Professor Friedmann has to say about administrative discretion
parallels what I recently said about the need for "rethinking on
the meaning of such basic values as liberty and property in the
legal and social context of contemporary society." The key proposition is that "there is always an element of choice, and therefore
of creative law-making, in each individual decision that applies
general criteria."49 What the author insists upon is "a clear distinction between the planning or policy level-where discretion
must be unhampered, unless the statute imposes a clear public or
private duty to act-and the operational level-where the duties
of care and the standards to be demanded of public authority
must, in the public interest, be equal to those demanded of private citizens." 50
Chapter 12, "Government Liability, Administrative Discretion
and the Individual," is an admirable exposition and discussion of
a subject in which new ideas are needed to meet the complexities
of world commercial and industrial relations. It begins by noting
how the Rechtsstaat (law state) idea, and the recognition of a
separate system of administrative law and jurisdiction, developed
a principle of government legal responsibility "at a time when the
common law jurisdictions were still firmly caught in the web of
feudal government immunities."'" Thus, government and public
authorities could be held liable on a legal basis and, yet, distinct
principles of governmental responsibility could be worked out according to principles of administrative law. French administrative
law, for example, developed the administrative contract. Since
common law theory only knew one type of contract, American
courts held public authorities either liable on the contract under
the usual rules or not liable at all. But the result is not juristically
satisfactory and the recognition of government contract as an institution of administrative law seems inevitable.
In the next section, "Governmental Liability and Tort," there is
an analysis of Dicey's proposition that the government servant's
personal liability for wrongs done in exercise of his public functions-while the Crown is immune-was based on the principle of
equality before the law. But, as Professor Friedmann notes, "the
whole doctrine of the common law has long ceased to have much
vitality,"52 and this rule is merely "an unsatisfactory mixture of
lingering feudal concepts, public law concepts and civil law con49.
50.
51.
52.
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cepts."53 In the United States, the Federal Tort Claims Act of
1946, legislation in 13 states, and judicial decisions have (1) recognized the principle of governmental liability subject to certain
exceptions, (2) established governmental tort immunity, or (3)
attempted to distinguish between the governmental and nongovernmental functions of municipal corporations. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has aptly styled this confusion a "quagmire. 5 4 It is apparent therefore, that the dichotomy of public law and private law
must be maintained.
Succeeding sections treat statute law, privileges of government,
function and status of the public corporation, and definition and
general characteristics of the public corporation. The author particularly criticizes the Federal Tort Claims Act as reactionary because it subjects a government corporation to the uncertainties of
government liability: "The tendency to turn all government corporations into agents of the Government reflects Congressional
jealousy rather than any clear thinking on the nature of public enterprise."5 5
The final chapter of Part IV is devoted to Anglo-American administrative remedies and procedures. In Continental Europe a
person aggrieved by an administrative act or procedure has a simple and comprehensive remedy. The challenged act or order can
be annulled, or the claimant can be compensated. In the commonlaw world, administrative proceedings are generally reviewed only
through the use of "extraordinary legal remedies."5 6 These are
technical remedies limited by settled rules, and there is no simple
all-embracing proceeding. Much needless trouble is caused in
common-law jurisdictions by a distinction as to judicial, quasi-judicial, and non-judicial proceedings and tribunals. Technical requirements and rules determine what is judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative; they also decide what constitutes a "denial of justice" or "error on the face of the record." Recently, the declaratory appeal and the declaratory judgment have been developed
as means of review. Nevertheless, there needs to be an overhaul
and simplification of administrative law procedures as has been
done in civil and in criminal procedure since 1912. Furthermore,
the conduct and review of administrative action must be systematized and unified as has been done for judicial action in the United
53.
54.
55.
56.
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These are the old prerogative writs of mandamus, certiorari, and

prohibition, or in equity the injunction, or today the declaratory judgment,
or in case of detention of the person, the writ of habeas corpus.
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States since 1912. In fact, it appears that administrative justice as a
whole needs organization and modernization. As Professor
Friedmann emphasizes: "The basic problem-the recognition of
the duality of the legal system as an inevitable corollary to the
development of modern government-is one which the common
law world can continue to ignore or belittle only at the cost of
failing to develop a healthy balance between the needs of administration in the modern welfare State and the essential rights of the
citizen. ' 7
Part V, "Law Between Nations," first considers social organization and international law. After an extensive examination, Professor Friedmann states nine conclusions: (1) Government corporations formed for the purpose of carrying out commercial or
other economic activities should clearly be presumed to be outside
the sphere of State immunities. (2) International trade agreements
will increase and will be effective among States of comparable
organization. (3) Effective customary rules as to trade between
neutrals and belligerents no longer exist and the only remedy lies
in ad hoc agreements. (4) The traditional distinction between
State acts and private acts are broken down because of State
transactions. (5) Any State must be presumed to have the means to
control activities that are intimately connected with the conduct of
foreign relations. (6) State responsibility for international delinquencies extends to the activities of all those groups and individuals
who, by the structure and organization of the State, must be presumed to act by authority of the government. (7) Where general
measures are applied equally to nationals and foreigners alike, it
is doubtful how far a principle of international law justifying a
claim for compensation is still recognized.5" (8) International law
still demands strict adherence to the principle of due process developed in jurisprudence-both nontotalitarian and totalitarian
countries profess agreement on minimum standards of procedural
justice. (9) Where states must cooperate, such cooperation will
be confined to states which agree on economic and social organization and principles. Thus, it can be seen that two world wars and
the increasing complexity of social, and economic and industrial
organization have had a profound effect on the international law
57. Id. at 413.

58. But compensation for losses incurred, not for expectation of future
profits, should be allowed in cases of specific commitments by treaty or
contract, appropriation of the benefits of foreign enterprise (unjust enrichment), or action contrary to reasonable expectation created by the action
of the State (estoppel). Id. at 467.
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expounded by Wheaton 9 and W. E. Hall" on which I was raised. St. Thomas Aquinas called upon us to look at law under the
aspect of eternity. However, if international law is looked at in a
universal aspect, it seems to be bewilderingly complex and particular.
Part IV concludes with a chapter on national sovereignty and
world order in the nuclear age which examines the political, economic and juristic aspects of international law trends and of international order. This examination consists of three sections: (1) the
present position of national sovereignty; (2) regional groupings
and universal international law; and (3) the development of international law on three levels-in these two areas and as a universal
law which expands "slowly in those fields where common interests and necessity are not deeply affected by divergent interests
and standards."'" The author then considers the interrelation of
these three levels, the legal integration of like-minded States, and,
the integration of standards in the transfer of national powers to a
supernational authority (in the European Coal and Steel Community). He notes the hope that the growing threat to the security
and, indeed, the survival of mankind may drive us to a world order. But mankind will probably need some remaking to assure
that result, and another destructive world war may result in our
being set back to a primitive civilization. Short of such a catastrophe, an instinct of self preservation may induce the contending blocs, we are told, "to remain at arm's length and to develop
for this purpose such legal relations and contacts as are required
for the maintenance of a live and let live co-existence."' To
this end, he reminds us, it is important that a universal organization such as the United Nations be kept in active operation for the
purpose of "universal levels of coexistence and even limited co-operation."63 And on the level of cooperative international law, he
adds, "the world will have to progress through less than universal
regional or functional groupings of more closely knit states--often developing in mutual antagonism--hoping for the day when
common faith or necessity may bring about a truly universal world
order."6 4
Part VI concludes the book with a chapter entitled "The Rule
of Law, The Individual and the Welfare State." Kantorowicz has
59. ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Boyd's ed. 1878).
60. INTERNATIONAL LAW (1st ed. 1880).
61. LAw IN A CHANGING SociETY 475 (1959).
62. Id. at 479-80.
63. Id. at 480.
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aptly said that Rechtswissenschaft ist Wortwissenschaft. Unfortunately, juristic discussions often take the form of controversies
over the meaning of words. Two phrases which are the subject of
the final chapter recall Kantorowicz's gibe. They are Dicey's well
known phrase, "the rule of law" and the term "welfare state."
The rule of law stood for the regime of adjusting relations and
ordering conduct in society by law. This is in contrast to leaving
them unordered subject to chance conflict and/or individual wilfulness or to the arbitrary ordering of them by official commands.
This easily suggests to student beginners the idea of a law as a legislative command and law as a body of such laws. By the rule of
law Dicey did not mean ordre juridique or Rechtsordnung; nor
did he want to suggest jus rather than lex to the untrained AngloAmerican ear. The term welfare state has also lost its real significance to the general reader or hearer because we have learned
from the beginning that even the most arbitrary tyranny has always
claimed to serve the welfare of its subjects. Thus, the adherents
of Bentham and Austin assume that those who use Dicey's phrase
are preaching their doctrine, and the jurists of the Soviet regime
assume that theirs is the modem state.
The author takes us over the common ground of jurisprudence,
social ethics, politics, and economics in their vicissitudes in this
era of far reaching social change. We are reminded that to give to
"the 'rule of law' concept a universally acceptable ideological content is as difficult as to achieve the same for 'natural law.' "65
Hence, Professor Friedmann only seeks to formulate a definition
acceptable to modem democratic ideas; he bases it on three foundations--equality, liberty, and the ultimate control of government
by the people. The first is understood to mean that inequalities
shall be inequalities of function and service but shall not be derived
from "race, religion, or other personal attributes." Liberty is interpreted to mean that in so far as an individual is granted specific
rights they are to be free from arbitrary interference. And the principle of control by the people is understood to mean that law must
ultimately be the responsibility of the elected representatives of the
people.
The complexity of modem life has caused a vast expansion of
governmental functions. The traditional function of the state was
that of protector. Classical liberal thought believed this was the
state's only legitimate function. But protection, as one function,
has been divided into many social service functions, and these are
a second category which require the development of administrative
65. Id. at 490.
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law. In addition the State now carries on industrial and commercial activities-a third category-and public enterprise often operates alongside private enterprise. This creates the need for an economic controller to allocate "scarce resources among different
industries and for different purposes." However, this creates a serious problem in a planned democratic economy; it holds that individual freedom is essential and, yet, it must reconcile the demands of both private and public enterprise. Finally, it is pointed
out that the state functions as arbitrator between different groups
in society. Today this raises serious problems in labor law. We are
told that the state as arbitrator in a democratic society has three
tasks: "maintenance of a rough balance between contending organized groups and the usually unorganized consumer; the protection of the individual freedom of association; and the safeguarding of overriding State interests."66
In his conclusion, the author observes that:
"it would be tragic if the law were so petrified as to be unable to respond to the unending challenge of evolutionary or revolutionary
changes in society. To the lawyer, this challenge means that he cannot
be content to be a craftsman. His technical knowledge will supply

the tools but it is his sense of responsibility for the society in 67which
he lives that must inspire him to be jurist as well as lawyer."

This book does for the law of the predawn of the twenty-first
century what Dicey's Law and Public Opinion in England in the
Nineteenth Century6" did for Anglo-American law of the twentieth
century. We thought, when I entered teaching as my life work in
1907, that he had taught us the path of the law. But it was the
path of the past. Now, I feel assured, we have been clearly shown
the path of the century to come. However, Professor Friedmann
would be the last to flatter himself that we shall now see la diritta
via for all time to come.

66. Id. at 502.

67. Id. at 503.
68. (1st ed. 1905).

